STATE
AMENDMENT
State of Rajasthan:
Amendment of Section 21, Central Act, 45 of 1860.- In Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Central Act 45 of 1860), in its application to the State of Rajasthan, after clause twelfth, the following new clause shall be added, namely:
“Thirteenth.- Every person employed or engaged by any public body in the conduct and supervision of any examination recognized or approved under any law.
Explanation :- The expression “Public Body” includes-
(a)a University, Board of Education or other body, either established by or under a Central or State Act or under the provisions of the Constitution of India or constituted by the Government; and
(b) a local authority.”
[Received the assent of the President on the 9th day of January, 1993 and Act published in Raj. Gaz. 11.2.1993 Pt.4(Ka), Extra; p.213].
COMMENTS
Bank Employees : If the Legislature wanted certain specific Bank employees to be considered “ Public Servants” for a limited purpose, the contrary cannot be held by taking recourse to the wide sweep of Section 21,I.P.C-N. Vaghul v. State of Maharashtra, 1987 Cr LJ 385 : (1987) 2 Crimes 289.
Banks: An employee of a nationalized bank is a public servant, being the employee of a Government company or of a corporation controlled by the Government of India.- Kundanlal v.B.N.Khanna, 1983 Cr LJ 141 (P&H). Contrary view in Raghunath Rai treble bt soecuak ciyrts fir cirryotuib abd itger charges .- Union of India v. Ashok Kumar Mitra, AIR 1995 SC 1976.
President and Secretary of the Co-operative Society : The President and Secretary of the Co- operative Society are not public servants within the meaning of clause 12(b) of Section 21 of the Indian Code.- State of Punjab v. Kesarichand, 1987 Cr LJ 549: AIR 1987 P&H 216.
Private Medical Practitioner: Private Medical Practitioners are not public servants even if their names are included in the panel of doctors.- Dr. Arvind C. Shah v. State of Gujrat,(1986)1 GLR 481 : (1986)2 C r LG 59.
Surveyor : Surveyor of Insurance claims does not fall within Section 21 (5) or Section 21 (12).- A.R.Puri v. State, (1987)2 Crimes 102 (Del).
MP : A member of Parliament is a Public Servant u/s 2(c) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.- P.V. Narasimha Rao v. State,(CBI/SPE),(1998)1 SCJ 529.
MLA : MILA is not a public servant .- R.S Nayak v. A.R Antulay, AIR 1984 SC 684 : 1984 Cr LJ 2080(Mad).
Ministers : Ministers are public servants because :
(a) they receive ‘pay’, an expression wider than salary,
(b) they are appointed by the Governor (articles 164 and 167 of the Constitution),
(c) they perform public functions .- M.Karunanidhi v Union of India, 1979 Cr LJ773 (SC) : AIR 1979 SC 598; Shiv Bahadur, 1954 CrLJ 910 (SC).
Co-operative Societies : Co- operative Societies are not corporations owned or controlled by the State. Their officer are not public servants – not even those on deputation from Government. – S.S. Dhanoa v. Delhi Municipality, 1981 Cr LJ 781.
22. “Movable property”.- The words “movable property” are intended to include corporal property of every description, except land and things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything which is attached to the earth.
23. “Wrongful gain”.- “wrongful gain” is gain by unlawful minas of property to which the person losing it is legally entitled.
“Wrongful loss”.- “Wrongful loss” is the loss by unlawful means of property to which the person losing it is legally entitled.
Gaining wrongfully , losing wrongfully.- A person is said to gain wrongfully. A person is said to lose wrongfully when such person retains wrongfully, as well as When such person retains wrongfully, as well as when such person acquire wrongfully. A person is said to lose wrongfully when such person is wrongfully kept out of any property, as well as when such person is wrongfully deprived of property.
COMMENTS
The first part of Section 23, third paragraph makes it clear that it covers wrongful acquisition as well as wrongful retention in other words, initial wrongfulness or subsequent wrongful. – Kirshan Kumar,(1960)1 SCR 452.
24. “Dishonestly”.- Whoever does anything with the intention of causing wrongful gain to one person or wrongful loss t o another person, is said to do that thing “dishonestly”.
COMMENTS
Concealment may
amount to dishonesty.-N. Vaghul v.
State of Maharshtra , 1987 Cr LJ 385: 1986 Bank J 643 : (1987)2 Crimes 289 :
(1986)3 Bom CR 422.
25. “Fraudulently”. – A person is said to do a thing fraudulently if he does that thing with intent to defraud but not otherwise.
COMMENTS
It is necessary to point out that pecuniary advantage or pecuniary harm is not necessary for an act to amount to ‘fraud’.- Dr.Vimla v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1963 SC 1572 : (1963)2 Cr LJ 432 : (1963) 2 SCJ 559
Conversely, deception is necessary to constitute fraud, but not necessary for causing wrongful gain or wrongful loss.- Dr. Vimla v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1963 sc 1572.
If there is neither deceit nor dishonest gain or loss, the case may not fall under either.- S.Dutt, 1966 CR LJ 459 (SC).
26. “Reason to believe”.- A person is said to have” reason to believe” a thing if he has sufficient cause to believe that thing but not otherwise.
27. Property in possession of wife, clerk or servant.- When property is in the possession of a person’s wife, clerk or servants, on account of that person, it is in that possession within the meaning of this Code.
Explanation.- A person employed temporarily or on a particular occasion in the capacity of a clerk or servant, is a clerk or servant within the meaning of this section.
COMMENTS
“On account to that person” :
It is necessary that the possession of the wife must be on account of her
husband. Thus where the wife is in
intendment control of certain articles, the Section will not apply.-
Dharam Singh, 1961Cr LJ 152 : AIR 1961 Punj 30. This position is
true of all discriminatory things.-
Chela Ram v. State, 1984 Cr LJ 1143 (Raj).
Possession in English Criminal Law : In Warner v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner, (1968) 2 All ER 356 (HL), the House of Lords clearly held that in criminal law the mental element is necessary to constitute possession and approved Lord Parker CJ’s decision in Lockyer v. Gibb, (1966)2 All ER 653, 655, to that effect:
“A person cannot be said to be in possession of some article which he or she does not realize is or may be in her handbag, in possession of some article which he or she does not realize is or may be in her handbag, in her room or in some other place over which she has control”.
28. “Counterfeit”. – A person is said to “counterfeit” who causes one thing to resemble another thing intending by means of that resemblance to practice deception, or knowing it to be likely that deception will thereby be practiced.
Explanation 1. -It is not essential to counterfeiting that the imitation should be exact.
Explanation 2.- When a person causes one thing to resample another thing, and the resemblance is such that a person might be deceived thereby, it shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved , that the person so causing the one thing to resemble the other thing intended by means of that resemblance to practice deception or knew it to be likely that deception would thereby be practiced.
29. “Document”.- The word “document” denotes any matter expressed or described upon any substance by means of letters, figures, or marks, or by more than one of those means, intended to be used or which may be used, as evidence of that matter.
Explanation 1. – It is immaterial by what means or upon what substance the letters, figures or marks are formed, or whether the evidence is intended, for or may be used in, a Court of Justice, or not.
Illustrations
A writing expressing the terms of a contract, which may be used as evidence of the contract, is a document.
A cheque upon a banker is a document.
A power- of attorney is a document.
A map or plan which is intended to be used or which may be used as evidence, is a document.
A writing containing directions or instructions is a document.
Explanation 2. – Whatever is expressed by means of letters, figures or marks as explained by mercantile or other usage, shall be deemed to be expressed by such letters, figures or marks within the meaning of this Section, although the same may not be actually expressed.
Illustration
A writes his name on the back of a bill of exchange payable to his order. The meaning of the endorsement, as explained by mercantile usage, is that the bill is to be paid to the holder. The endorsement is a document, and must be construed in the same manner as if the words “Pay to the older” or words to that effect had been written over the signature.
1[29A. “Electronic record”- The words “electronic record” shall have the meaning assigned to them on clause (t) of sub section (1) of section 2 of the Information Technology Act, 2000.]
30. “Valuable security”.- The words “valuable security” denote a document which is, or purports to be, a document where by any legal right is created, extended, transferred, retracted, extinguished or released, or where by any person acknowledges that he lies under legal liability , or has not a certain legal right.
Illustration
A writes his name on the back of a bill of exchange. As the effect of this endorsement is to transfer the right to the bill to any person who may become the lawful holder of it the endorsement is a “valuable security”.
COMMENTS
The essence of ‘valuable securities lies in its essential link with(a) a legal right , or (b) a legal liability. In the case of a legal right, a mere acknowledgement that a person does not have a legal right becomes a valuable right. This is different from “release”, in which the right is asserted, but (by the same instrument) abandoned.
The principal Sections of the Code in which the expression “value able secretly” occurs are concerned with (a) offences against the human body (Sections 329-331, 347,348), (b) offences against property (Section 420), and(c) offences relating to documents (Sections 467 and471).
An unregistered document (which is not fully effective without registration) is not, in the strict sense, a valuable security but it purports to be a valuable security and so falls within Section 467 (forgery of valuable security, etc).- Kashi Nath v. Naik, (1897) ILR 25 Cal 207.
If a document purports to be only a copy of a valuable security , its forgery is not punishable under Section 467.- Gobinda Prasad, (1962) I 1 Cr LJ 316.
However, in certain circumstances, such conduct may amount to the offence of cheating.
31. “A will”. The words “a will” denote any testamentary document.
COMMENTS
Section 31 of IPC may be compared with Section 2 (h) of Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925). The latter defines “will” as the legal declaration of the intentions of a testator with respect to his property when he desires to be carried into effect after his death. Forgery of a will is punishable under Section 467 of the Indian Penal Code.
32. Words referring to acts include illegal omissions.- In every part of this Code, except where a contrary intention appears from the context , words which refer to acts done extend also to illegal omissions.
COMMENTS
Compare Section3(2), General Clauses Act, 1897 (latter part) where it enacts that words which refer to acts done extend also to illegal omissions.
Concept of “act” : in jurisprudence “act” means any event which is subject to the control of the human will. See salmond Jurisprudence(11th edition), pages 399-401.
The emoluments of an “act” are-
(1) its origin in some mental or bodily activity of the doer,
(2) its circumstances, and
(3) its consequences.
Omission is covered with in ‘act’ if it is illegal.- Rewati Mohan Das v. Yatindra Mohan Ghosh, AIR 1934 PC 100. But it does not appear to be necessary that the omission should be intentional.
If there is a duty to take care in a particular situation, omission to take care in that situation would be punishable.- Benoy Chandra, 1984 Cr LJ 1038(Cal). An omission to act with care if caused by ‘mental’ blackout, would be excused.- Cf Bratty v. Attorney General for Northern Ireland,, (1961)3 All ER 523(HL).
According to Holmet, The Common Law, Para 91 : an act is always a voluntary muscular contraction and nothing else.
Sleep walking : Conduct during fit or in sleep walking is excused as it is involuntary.- R v. Charlson, (1955)1 All ER 859,861,864; R v. Padison, (1973)3 All ER 347; Cf. Ellholt- Responsibility for involuntary acts, Ryan v. R (1967), 687 41 Australian Law Journal 497.
33. “
Act”, “Omission”.- The word “act” denotes as well a series of
acts, as a single act; the word “omission” denotes as well a series of
omissions as a single omission.
COMMENT
Read with Section32, Section 33 yields
the following propositions:-
“Act” includes-
(a)
a single
positive act.
(b)
Series of acts.
(c)
A single
illegal ommision.
(d)
A series of illegal omissions.
34. Acts done by several
persons in furtherance of common intonation.- When a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of
the common intention of all, each
of all ,each of such persons is liable
for that act in the same ;manner as if
it were done by him alone.
CHARGE
That on or
about you……………at……………..along with B.C.D.E., etc., committed a criminal
act (enter the detail of the act) punishable under Section 34,I.P.C., in
furtherance of a common intention or you………….
And B.C.D.E. etc., arrived at (give the date and time) the meeting,(give the details of common
intention ) and you are guilty under Section ………of the I.P.C, read with Section
34, I..P.C.
COMMENTS
Principle: The
principle underlying the section is that as the intention is common, the
liability must also be common.- Ganesh Singh
v. Ram Rafie, (1869)S3 Bom. LR (Privy Council) 44,45; B.N.
Sirkantiah v.State, AIR 1958 SC 672.
See also Viswanth Shanthamallappa Dhule v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1998 SC 246
: 1998 Cr LJ 400.
Nature of the liability : Where
Section 34 applies, the liability of the person liable by
virtue of the section (participation in the criminal act with common
intention) is not the liability as an
abettor but liability as a principal.- Nga Aung Thein, 1935 ILR 13 RANG (210).
When a criminal act is done by several persons : Participation in the act and common intention
are two essential ingredients of the section. Therefore, a person who has at no
time played any part in the act charged cannot be held guilty by virtue of this
section. (Though the participation may not be active or physical or
immediate.)- Inderjit v. State, 1986 Cr LJ 966 (Del); Dasrathlal v. State of
Gujarat,1979 Cr LJ 1078 (SC).
Applicability of :
(i)
The court is to
take recourse to this section even if the section is not specifically
mentioned. The finding that assailant concerned should have common intention
with the other accused which is in restoration of such a recourse to this
section.- Dhanna v.State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1996 SC 2478.
(ii)
Section 34
applies even if cumulative effect of injuries be of nature sufficient in the
ordinary course of nature to cause
death .- State of Assam v. Siba Prasad. Bora, 1985 Cr LJ 43(Gau). See also
Lakha Singh v. Singh of Punjab, AIR
1998 SC 323 : 1998 Cr LJ 657
(iii)
In order to
attract Section 34 of the Code, there must be pr-arranged plan and meeting of
minds which may also develop on the spot. The conduct of the accused preceding,
attending and following the occurrence
is relevant to find out as to whether he had shared the common intention.- Domu
chopadi v. State, 1986 (2) Cr LC 261 (Orissa).
(iv)
When accused
acted in heat of moment and was on bail for the years, sentence
reduced from RI of 3 years to RI of one
and half year.- Rajendra Prasad v. State of Bihar, 1987 Cr LJ 1069 : AIR 1987
SC 1335 : 1987 CR LR 273 (SC).
(v)
Mere surrender
by appellant along with accused before the
police dies not show meeting of minds as to bring the case within ambit of Section 34.- Rangaswami
v. State of T.N., AIR 1989 SC 1137 : 1+989 Cr LJ 875.
(vi)
When an offence
is committed in furtherance of common intention of two or more accused, then every one of them is guilty.- State of Punjab v. Surjit
Singh, (1987) 1 SCJ 254 : 1987 Cr LJ 845 ; AIR 1987 SC 1045 : (1987)1 Crimes
252
(vii)
When
circumstances led to no other inference except that of guilt of accuses,
conviction is justified.- Basanti v. State of H.P., 1987 Cr LJ 1869 :AIR 1987 SC 1572.
(viii)
Strong
suspicion against accused cannot take place of proof.- Basanti v. State of
H.P.,1967 Cr LJ1869: AIR 1987 SC 1572.
(ix)
In order to
convict a person vicariously liable under Section 34 or Section 149, it is not
necessary to prove that each and every one or them had indulged in it is not
necessary to prove that eat and every one of them had indulged in it is not
necessary to prove that each and every one of them had indulged in overt acts,-
Rambilas Singh v. State of Bihar,1989 Cr LJ 1782: AIR 1989 SC 1593 : (1989) 2
SCJ 280 : (1989)2 Crimes 368 (SC).
Establishment of common intention, done by
proving that each shared the intention with the others. It may be formed at the
spur of the moment .- Dajya Moshya Bhil v. State of Maharashtra, 1984 Cr LJ
1728 :AIR 1984 SC 1717. Common intention held a question of fact.- Maqsoodan v.
State of U.P., AIR 1983 SC 126 : 1983
Cr LJ 218.
Sharing of common intention by all the
accused:
(i)
Accused armed
with Dharya which hit the forehead or the victim, who was being chased with
stones by other co-accused.
(ii)
Sharing of common
intention can be inferred from the fact that second accused secured the deceased and the first accused stabbed him.- Bachittar Singh v. State, (Delhi
Administration), 1991 CrLJ2619 (Delhi). See also Vishwanath Shanthamallappa
Dhule v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1998
SC 246 : 1998 Cr LJ 400.
(iii)
Some of the
accused committing assault on deceased. All of accused persons are not liable
for conviction, Dukhmochan Pandey v. State of Bihar, 1998 Cr LJ 66: AIR 1998 SC
40.
Benefit of doubt :
(i)
intention of
one of the accused proved but not conductively in the case of others. Held,
benefit of doubt to be extended, sentence reduced from life to 5 years.-
Ranapartap v. State of Haryana, AIR 1983 SC 680: 1983 Cr LJ 1272: 1983 (2)
Crime 342 (SC).
(ii)
The
accused in the instant case took
a leading part by entering the house and aiding and assisting other in
murdering six persons in the house. He was armed with a gun and participated in
the murder of the deceased. He was given benefit of doubt since the witnesses
described the features of the accused and they did not tally.- Lokpal Singh v.
State of M.P., 1985 Cr LJ 1134 : AIR 1985 SC 891 : (1985) Cr LR (SC)189.
(iii)
Supreme Court
found the fact and circumstance which proved joint participation of appellants
in the crime, in the manner in which looted properties were distributed among them.- Mukund alias
Kundu Mishjra v. State of M.P., AIR
1997 SC 2622 : 1997 Cr LJ 3182 : (1997)2 SCJ 65.
Common Ingredient of:
(i) All other accursed are acquitted as evidence of eye witnesses did not prove
their participation in the offence of
murder. Main accused could not be given benefit of doubt on the same ground.
The benefit of doubt does not come under finding of the evidence of some witness as being totally false and absolutely
unreliable.- Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1996 SC 755 : (1996)2 SCJ
130.
(ii) All
accused acted in concert, were associated with each other in dragging the
deceased.
35. When
such an act is criminal by reason of its being
done with a criminal knowledge or intention.-Whenever an act, which is criminal only by reason of its being done with
a criminal knowledge or intention, is
dine by several persons, each of such persons who joins in the act with
such knowledge or intention is liable for the act in the same manner as if the act were done by him
alone with that knowledge or intention.
36.
Effect caused partly by act
and partly by omission.- Wherever
the causing of a certain effect, or an
attempt to cause that effect, by an act or by an omission, is an offence, it
is to be understood that the causing of
that effect partly by an act and party by an omission is the same offence.
Illustration
A intentionally causes Z’s death, partly by
illegally omitting to give Z food, and
partly by beating Z.A has committed murder.
37. Co-operation
by doing one of several acts
constituting an offence.- When an offence is committed by means of
several acts, whoever intentionally co-operates in the commission of that offence by doing any
one of those acts either singly or
jointly with any other person, commits that offence.
Illustration
(a) A and B agree to murder Z by severally
and at different times giving him small doses of poison. A and B administer the poison according to the to the
agreement with intent to Murder Z. Z dies from the defect of the several doses
of poison so administered to him. Here A and B intentionally co-operate in the
commission of murder and as each of them dies an act by which the death is
caused, they are both guilty of the offence though their acts are Separate.
(b) A and B are joint jailors, and as such
have the charge of Z, a prisoner alternatively for six hours at a time. A and
B, intending to cause Z’s death, knowingly co-operate in causing that effect by
illegally omitting, each during the time of his attendance, to furnish Z with
food supplied to them for that purpose
, dies of hunger. Both A and B are
guilty of the murder of Z.
(c)
A, a jailor , has the charge of Z, a
prisoner. A, intending to cause Z’s death, illegally omits to supply Z with
food in consequence of which Z is much
reduced in strength, but the starvation is not sufficient to cause his death. A
us dismissed from his office, and B
succeeds him. B, without collusion or co-operation with A, illegally omit to
supply Z with food, knowing that he is likely thereby to cause Z’s death. Z
dies of hunger. B is guilty of murder,
but as A did not co-operate with B. A
is guilty only of an attempt to commit murder
38. Persons
concerned in criminal act may be guilty
of different offences.- When
several persons are engaged or concerned
in the commission of a criminal act, they may be guilty of different
offences by means of that act.
Illustration
A attacks Z under such circumstances of grave provocation that his killing of Z would be only culpable homicide not
amounting to murder B, having ill- will
towards Z and intending to kill him,
and not having been subject to the provocation, assists A in killing Z. Here,
though A and B both engaged in causing Z’s death, B is guilty of murder, and A is guilty only of culpable homicide.
39. “Voluntarily”.- A person is said to cause an effect “
voluntarily” When he causes it by means whereby he intended to caused to
cause it, or by means , at the time of
employing those means, he knew or had
reason to believe to be likely to cause it.
Illustration
A
sets fire, by night, to an inhabited house in a large town, for the purpose of
facilitating a robbery and thus causes the death of a person. Here, A may not
have intended to cause death; and
may even be sorry that death has been
caused by his act; yet, if he knew that he was likely to cause death, he has
caused death voluntarily.
1[40. “Offence “.- Except in the 2[Chapters]
and sections mentioned in clauses 2 and 3 of this section, the words “offence”
denotes a thing made punishable by this
Code.
In
Chapter IV, 3[Chapter V A] and in the following sections namely, sections “[64, 65, 66, 5[67],
71], 109, 110, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 187, 194, 195, 203, 211, 213, 214, 221,
222, 223, 224, 225, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 347, 348, 388, 389,and 445, the
words “ offence” has the same meaning
when the thing punishable under the
special or local law is punishable under such law with imprisonment for
a term of six months or upwards, whether with or without fine.]
________________________________________________________
1.
Subs
.by Act 27 of 1870, sec. 1, for the original section.
2.
Subject.
by Act 8 of 1930, sce.2 and Sch.1,
for “Chapter”.
3.
Ins.
by Act 8 of 1913, sec. 2.
4.
Ins.
by Act 8 of 1882,sec.1.
5.
Ins. by Act 10 if 1886, sec. 21
(1)
41. “Special law”.- A “special law” is a law applicable to a particular subject.
42. “ Local law”.- A “local law” is a law applicable only to a particular part of 6[7[***]8[ India]].
43. “ Illegal”, “Legally bound to do”.- The word “illegal” is applicable to everything which is an offence or which is prohibited by law, or which furnishes ground for a civil action; and a person is said to be “legally bound to do” whatever it is illegal in him to omit.
44. “Injury”.- The word “injury” denotes any harm whatever illegally caused to any person, in body, mind, reputation or property.
45. “Life”.- The word” death” denotes the death of a human being, unless the contrary appears from the context .
46. “Death”.-The word “death” denotes the death of a human being , unless the contrary appears from the context.
47. “Animal”.- The word “animal” denotes any living creature, other than a human being.
48. “Vessel”.-The word “vessel” denotes any thing made for the conveyance by water of human beings or of property.
49. “Year”,” Month”.- Wherever the word “year” or the word “month” is used, it is to be understood that the year or the month is to be reckoned according to the British calendar.
50. “Section”.- The word” section denotes one of those portions of a Chapter of this Code which are distinguished by prefixed numeral figures.
51. “Oath”.- The
word “oath” includes a solemn
affirmation substituted by law for an oath, and any declaration required or
authorized by law to be made before a public servant or to be used for the purpose or authorized by law to be made
before a public servant or to be used for the purpose of proof, whether in a
Court of Justice or not.
52. “Good faith”.- Nothing is said to be done or believed in “good faith” which is
done or believed without due care and attention.
52A. “Harbor”.- Except in section 157, and in section 130 in the case in which the harbour is given by the wife or husband or the person harboured, the word “ harbor” includes the supplying a person with shelter, food, drink, money, clothes, arms, ammunition or means or conveyance, or the assisting a person by ant means, whether of the same kind as those enumerated in this section or not, to evade apprehension.]
OF PUNISHMENTS
53. Punishment.- The punishments to which offenders are liable under the provisions of this Code are-
First.- Delhi;
2[Secondly.- Imprisonment for life;]
3[***]
Fifthly.- Forfeiture of property ;
Sixthly.- Fine.
COMMENTS
Punishment and sentence both are clubbed together for their sililarily in between; Ramesh Chandra v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1999 (1) JCJ 223.
_______________________________________________________
(a)
Ins.
by Act 8 of 1942,sec.2.
(b)
Subs.
by Act 26 of 1995,sec. 117 and Sch., for “Secondly – Transportation”(
w.e.f.1-1-1956).
(c)
Clause
“Thirdly” omitted by Act 17 of 1949,sec.2 (w.e.f.1-1-1956)
1[53A. Construction of reference to transportation- (1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) and sub-section (3), any reference to “transportation for life” in any other law for the time being in force or in any instrument or order having effect by virtue of any such law or of any enactment repealed shall be construed as a reference to “imprisonment for life”.
(2) every case in which a sentence of transportation for a term has been passed before the commencement of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment)Act, 2[1955] (26 of 1955), the offender shall be dealt with in the same manner as if sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for the same term.
(3) Any reference to transportation for a term or to transportation for any shorter term (by whatever name called) in any other law for the time being in force shall be deemed to have been omitted.
(4) Any reference to “transportation” in any other law for the time being in force shall .-
(a) if the expression means transportation for life, be construed as a reference to imprisonment for life;
(b) if the expression means transportation for any shorter term, be deemed to have been omitted.]
54. Commutation of sentence of death.- In every case in which sentence of death shall have been passed, 3[the appropriate Government] may, without the consent of the offender, commute the punishment for any other punishment provided by this Code.
55. Commutation of sentence of imprisonment for life.- In every case in which sentence of 4[imprisonment] for life shall have been passed, 5[the appropriate Government] may, without the consent of the offender, commute the punishment for imprisonment of either description for a term not exceeding fourteen years.
55A. Definition of “appropriate Government”.- In sections 54 and 55 the expression “ appropriate Government” means,-
(a) in case where the sentence is a sentence of death or is for an offence against any law relating to a matter to which the executive power of the Union extends, the Central Government; and
(b) in case where the sentence (whether of death or not )is for an offence against any law relating to a matter to which the executive power of the State extends, the Government of the State within the offender is sentenced.]
56. Sentence of Europeans and Americans to penal servitude, proviso as to sentence for term exceeding ten years but not for life.- [Rep. By the Criminal Law(Removal of Racial Discriminations) Act, 1949(17 of 1949) (w.e.f. 6-4-1949).]
57. Fractions of terms of punishment.- In calculating fractions of terms of punishment, 1[imprisonment] for life shall be reckoned as equivalent to 1[imprisonment] for twenty years.
58. Offenders sentenced to transportation how dealt with until transported.-[Rep. By the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment )Act, 1955,sec.117 and Sch.(w.e.f. 1-1-1956).]
59. Transportation instead of imprisonment.- [Rep. By the Code of Criminal Procedure(Amendment) Act, 1955 (26 of 1955), sec 117 and Sch.(w. e .f.1-1-1956).
60. Sentence may be (in certain cases of imprisonment )wholly or partly rigorous or simple.- In every case in which an offender is punishable with imprisonment which may be of either description, it shall be competent to the court which sentences such offender to direct in the sentence that such imprisonment shall be wholly rigorous, or that such imprisonment shall be whole simple , or that any part of such imprisonment shall be rigorous and the rest simple.
61. Sentence of forfeiture of property.- [Rep. By the Indian Penal Code (Amendment) Act, 1921 (16 of 1921), sec.4.]
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1. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955,
sec.117 and Sch., for “transportation” (w.e.f.1-1-1956)
62. Forfeiture of property in respect of offenders punishable with death, transportation or imprisonment .- [ Rep. By the Indian Penal Code (Amendment) Act, 1921 (16 of 1921) sec.4.]
63. Amount of fine.- Where no sum is expressed to which a fine may extend, the amount of fine to which the offender is liable is unlimited, but shall not be excessive.
64. Sentence of imprisonment for non-payment of fine.- 2 [In every case, of an offence punishable with imprisonment as well as fine, in which the offender is sentenced to a fine, whether with or without imprisonment, and in every case of an offence punishable 3[with imprisonment of fine, or] with fine only , in which the offender is sentenced to a fine,]
It
shall be competent to the Court which
sentence such offender to direct by the
sentence that, in default of payment of the fine, the offender shall
suffer imprisonment for a certain term, which imprisonment shall be in excess of any other imprisonment to which he
may have been sentenced or to which he may be liable under a commutation of a sentence.
65. Limit to imprisonment for non-payment of fine.- The term for which the court directs the offender to be imprisoned in default of payment of a fine shall not exceed one-fourth of the term of imprisonment which is the maximum fixed for the offence, if the offence be punishable with imprisonment as well as fine.
66. Description of imprisonment for non-payment of fine.- The imprisonment which the Court imposes in default of payment of a fine may be of any description to which the offender might have been sentenced for the offence.
2. Subs. by Act 8 of
1882,sec. 2 for “In every case in which
an offender is sentenced to a fine”.
3.
Ins. by Act 10 of 1886, sec. 21(2).